From a look at information headlines, you’d assume the U.S.-India relationship is in disaster. It isn’t—not but anyway. But it surely might be.

The partnership with India is among the few U.S. relationships that has deepened however transitions from the Bush to the Obama to the Trump administrations. However a lot of variations are coming to a head over the subsequent few months that might stall and even derail progress.

As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo plans to move to India subsequent week, and President Donald Trump meets lately re-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Japan in the course of the G20 summit, each these convergences and divergences might be on the agenda. If not dealt with with care, the latter might overshadow the previous, with lasting penalties.

The Constructive Aspect of the Ledger

Over the past two years, there was regular progress within the U.S.-India relationship. Strategically, either side have seen the opposite as taking part in a vital position of their Asia methods—for the U.S., its Free and Open Indo-Pacific technique; for India, its Act East coverage. This has paved the best way for deeper diplomatic, protection, and safety cooperation. The 2 international locations established a ministerial-level 2+2 protection and diplomatic dialogue final 12 months, their highest-level institutionalized strategic dialogue. Senior bureaucrats and navy officers now meet often, and their numerous safety dialogues have continued to fulfill on points resembling protection know-how, cyber safety, and counterterrorism. Liaisons between the Indian navy and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain, and the international locations’ protection innovation items, are being established.

A sequence of agreements—negotiated for years—that might facilitate better interoperability and know-how switch have lastly been signed. The U.S. and India have operationalized the Logistics Change Memorandum of Settlement (LEMOA), applied the Helicopter Operations from Ships different Than Plane Carriers (HOSTAC) program, and signed the Communications Compatibility and Safety Settlement (COMCASA). They’re additionally negotiating the Industrial Safety Annex that can allow better cooperation between the protection industries, and have restarted talks on the Fundamental Change and Cooperation Settlement that might pave the best way for geospatial intelligence sharing.

Their diplomatic engagements additionally contain different international locations. The 2 international locations have upgraded their trilateral with Japan, with the three leaders assembly final fall, and restarted and continued quadrilateral consultations that additionally embrace Australia. In 2018, after a decade, they revived their air drive train (with Japan current as an observer), and this 12 months, they’re anticipated to start out a tri-services train. As well as, earlier this 12 months, the Indian navy joined USAFRICOM’s Cutlass Categorical train for the primary time, and American observers (together with some from New Zealand) have been included within the Australia-India naval train. Furthermore, the American and Indian navies undertook a gaggle sail with Japan and the Philippines within the South China Sea lately.

Protection commerce has been one other plus-point. India has began receiving Apache and Chinook helicopters (each of which beat out Russian choices), and deploying American tools like P-8is and C-130s to increase its attain within the Indian Ocean area. The U.S. granting India Strategic Commerce Authorization Tier 1 standing might additional facilitate the export of superior know-how. Washington has reportedly authorised the sale of armed drones and multi-role helicopters, and the 2 international locations are additionally in talks for additional offers.

Past protection and safety cooperation, Washington has proved to be useful to New Delhi in two crises—in the course of the current India-Pakistan stress following the February 14 terrorist assault in Kashmir, and, in a quieter means, in the course of the Sino-Indian stand-off on the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction in 2017. Within the current flare-up, it backed India’s place, not simply rhetorically, however on the United Nations Safety Council. It helped draft and push via an announcement condemning Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed and get its chief Masood Azhar designated as a terrorist (a long-standing effort that was being blocked by China). It additionally took the lead on the Monetary Motion Job Drive to grey-list Pakistan for its lack of motion in opposition to terror financing. Together with Paris, Washington is now nearly taking part in the position Moscow used to for India in these sorts of boards.

Even U.S.-India financial ties, the place strains are pronounced, have deepened over the previous couple of years. When it comes to commerce in items, over 2018-19, the U.S. as soon as once more grow to be India’s largest buying and selling associate (if one contains providers, it has held that rank for some time). Not solely has U.S.-India commerce grown, however, not like with many different international locations, the American commerce deficit with India has decreased (from $27 billion in 2017 to $21 billion in 2018). Each American overseas direct funding into India and Indian overseas funding into the U.S. have elevated. India is now additionally importing U.S. oil and gasoline (and has additionally benefited from the downward strain on power costs that American manufacturing has engendered over the previous couple of years). The variety of Indian college students within the U.S. has elevated, and so has two-way vacationer movement.

The Unfavourable Aspect of the Ledger

Nevertheless, whilst the connection has progressed steadily on many fronts, a lot of issues have arisen. Some stem not from bilateral points, however from U.S. insurance policies concentrating on different international locations. Indian pursuits have been adversely affected by the American withdrawal from the Paris local weather change settlement, aluminum and metal tariffs, and the change within the U.S. method in Afghanistan that has led to talks with Taliban (which India stays extremely skeptical, if not involved about). Add to that checklist Washington’s sanctions on oil imports from Iran and Venezuela, each of which have been main Indian suppliers.

Then there’s the Countering America’s Adversaries By Sanctions Act (CAATSA) handed by Congress in 2017, which was meant to focus on Iran and Russia. India’s resolution to buy 5 Russian S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile techniques, nevertheless, implies that it might doubtlessly be the goal of sanctions. American officers have additionally expressed severe concern that the S-400 buy might restrict future interoperability with the Indian navy, in addition to high-technology cooperation and protection gross sales.

Legislators have granted the president authority to waive the sanctions, however American officers have made clear that such a waiver shouldn’t be a given and, amongst different issues, requires India to indicate it’s lowering its dependence on Russia. And Washington is chagrined that, even past the S-400 deal, over the past 12 months, India has signed extra offers with Moscow for leasing a nuclear submarine, a producing facility for Kalashnikov rifles, and the manufacturing or buy of frigates. These 4 offers, value over $12 billion (with extra offers being contemplated), would rely as “vital transactions” underneath CAATSA. In addition they put in perspective the oft-touted statistic that the U.S. and India have signed protection offers value $16 billion since 2008. And so they have come whilst Moscow has deepened relations with Beijing, broadened them with Islamabad, and brought a impartial stance in the course of the India-Pakistan disaster (even providing to mediate between the 2 international locations).

The key bilateral sore spot is on the financial facet, the place friction over commerce, funding, and immigration considerations has solely elevated. To pre-existing American considerations about market entry and value controls on medical units, the Trump administration has added considerations about India’s e-commerce rules and knowledge localization plans. The Indian authorities, in flip, has considerations about potential adjustments to U.S. immigration insurance policies. Not too long ago, the Trump administration ended India’s commerce advantages underneath the Generalized System of Preferences, which impacts about $5.5 billion of Indian exports. And the Modi authorities imposed retaliatory tariffs that it had introduced final 12 months, however suspended till this previous week. Greater shocks might be coming if the U.S. did certainly launch a broad-spectrum investigation into India’s commerce and funding practices, as is reportedly being thought of (or at the very least floated as a negotiating tactic).

These commerce frictions are of specific concern. For one, it is a matter President Trump cares about deeply, and the grounds on which he measures relationships—way over what any nation does or doesn’t do on the protection and safety entrance. Second, he has proven that he’s prepared to hyperlink nationwide safety and commerce commitments even with allies—it is a far cry from the final two administrations, which prioritized long-term strategic ties over short-term financial frictions. Third, the basket of points on which there are variations has expanded. Fourth, provided that these financial difficulties contain and have an effect on key home priorities and constituencies for each governments, concessions usually are not straightforward for both facet to make. And at last, either side appear to imagine they’re talking from positions of energy and would possibly really feel they don’t have to make concessions—Modi after receiving an excellent stronger electoral mandate, and Trump after garnering concessions from international locations like Canada and Mexico.

Add to this one other potential problem coming down the pike: the safety of India’s future telecommunications system. After which there’s the potential for a U.S.-Iran escalation, which might throw a spanner within the works. It will not simply complicate India’s relations with each international locations (to not point out Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), but additionally be seen as severely disruptive to Indian pursuits within the Center East, which homes hundreds of thousands of Indians and is a key supply of the oil and pure gasoline India consumes. Any escalation would additionally hinder India’s try to ascertain a (non-Pakistan) transit hall via Iran to Afghanistan. Furthermore, it will (as soon as once more) distract the U.S. from specializing in Asia, the place Delhi sees extra converging pursuits with Washington.

Divergences vs. Convergences

This sequence of variations—coming as they do collectively—threatens to overshadow the very actual progress in U.S.-India relations within the first couple of years of the Trump administration. They’ve already strengthened conventional considerations that the 2 international locations have about one another. Within the U.S., in some quarters, this contains asking whether or not the connection with India is value it; in India, whether or not the U.S. is dependable.

Advocates of the connection and of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific idea shouldn’t be sanguine that structural and strategic components—significantly convergence ensuing from concern a couple of rising China’s conduct—will naturally maintain the divergences from dominating over the convergences. They should work onerous to make sure that they won’t achieve this.

This may imply the 2 international locations needing to get off their respective excessive horses and present a willingness to make concessions, discover compromises, and strike offers throughout sectors.

Extremely unhelpful, if not, counterproductive is the truth that either side have forgotten a lesson realized over the past decade and a half—that variations between the 2 international locations are higher managed or resolved if they’re sorted out behind closed doorways. Washington has been significantly responsible of forgetting this over the previous couple of months. Publicly demanding that international locations make a sure alternative makes it more durable for them to make it. In India’s case because of this despite the fact that the U.S. has now reportedly supplied India choices if it doesn’t undergo with the S-400 acquisition, the best way this has performed out publicly makes it more durable for Delhi to stroll away from this deal, because it has achieved with others.

The general public statements on S-400 or leaks from sources threatening retaliatory caps on H1-B visas (which is a congressional prerogative) reinforce the picture that many nonetheless maintain in India of an America that makes calls for of India by way of insurance policies or purchases, constrains its decisions, and doesn’t take its pursuits under consideration. It strengthens the palms—and arguments—of these within the institution who stay skeptical, if not suspicious, of an Indian partnership with the U.S. This sentiment isn’t just prevalent on India’s left, as a current speech by the pinnacle of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh made clear. Lastly, public strain muddies unbiased cost-benefit debates that Indians must be having concerning the S-400 or telecom coverage which have now been framed as making a alternative between the U.S. and Russia or the U.S. and China.

India, for its half, can not complain about American transactionalism, whilst Delhi makes loads of asks too. Furthermore, it must acknowledge that agreements like LEMOA usually are not India doing the U.S. a favor—they’re in Indian pursuits, serving to it improve navy functionality and attain. And, significantly given the slowdown in financial development, Delhi must ask itself whether or not its present method to commerce and overseas funding is the appropriate one, or whether or not it may do extra to profit from world engagement (because it has achieved prior to now), and significantly the U.S.-China commerce warfare.

Indian observers want to withstand framing all the pieces as a alternative imposed by the U.S.

In the meantime, Indian observers want to withstand framing all the pieces as a alternative imposed by the U.S. Moreover, critics can not first complain concerning the U.S. not providing India high-end protection tools after which, when it does supply tools (typically on the Indian authorities’s request), complain the U.S. is demanding that India purchase it. This line has grow to be so engrained that critics dismiss or ignore India’s personal considerations about Russian protection corporations or Chinese language telecommunications corporations. They allege, as an alternative, that the U.S. is forcing a alternative to profit its corporations, generally forgetting that, in lots of circumstances, it’s European and never American corporations that supply the options.

General, if the strategic relationship—and the U.S. and India’s Asia methods—is to endure, the 2 international locations should keep in mind that the connection has been strategically and economically mutually useful. They should step again from the brinkmanship seen in current weeks. To some extent, either side are maybe behaving this fashion as a result of there’s a way that convergence on China—and mutual want for the opposite of their respective balancing methods—will make the opposite facet blink.

However historical past tells us that’s not a given. Within the years after the 1962 warfare, there was the same shared American and Indian view of a China problem. However their cooperation to deal with that problem first slowed after which stalled due to American asks (India-Pakistan talks, limiting protection offers with the Soviet Union, financial reform), and India’s incapacity to ship on its financial potential. What that led to is restricted U.S.-India relations, better house for China, and elevated India dependence—after which overdependence—on the Soviet Union. We should always not assume {that a} related situation is not possible at present.